George W. S. Bailey. prove that mental phenomena in general are not self- intimating in sense (3). Armstrong's argument is based on two claims: (a) Introspective awareness and its objects are distinct existences. (b) If introspective awareness ...

Reason's Grief takes W. B. Yeats's comment that we begin to live only when we have conceived life as tragedy as a call for a tragic ethics, something the modern West has yet to produce. Harris argues that we must turn away from religious understandings of tragedy and the human condition and realize that our species will occupy a very brief period of history, at some point to disappear without a trace. We must accept an ethical perspective that avoids pernicious (...) fantasies about ultimate redemption but that sees tragic loss as a permanent and pervasive aspect of our daily lives, yet finds a way to think, feel and act with both passion and hope. Reason's Grief takes us back through the history of our thinking about value to find our way. The call is for nothing less than a paradigm shift for understanding both tragedy and ethics. (shrink)

Relying on Heidegger’s ›Being and Time‹, the paper discusses music as a discrete form of thinking. It argues that music should be understood as the future-oriented articulation of humans’ fundamentally affective relatedness to the world. Conceiving of music as the articulation of fundamental affectivity allows us to combine formalist and expressivist approaches to music: Music must have form in order to articulate, but has significance only insofar as it articulates humans’ fundamentally affective relatedness to the world. By taking this approach (...) we are able to account for the discreteness of music as a form of thinking without limiting ourselves to art music. (shrink)

The paper puts forward a criticism of two interdependent aspects of Donald Davidson’s and John McDowell’s respective philosophies of language. On the one hand, I criticize the notion that successful communication can be treated as the starting point for explaining the social dimension of linguistic meaning. On the other hand, I deal with the problematic way in which the authors seem to claim that language’s openness to the world, which for them explains its relationship to the world in general, can (...) be taken for granted. As for the social dimension of language, I argue that conflict – and not instances of successful communication – should be seen as the rule in the constitution of linguistic meaning. This revised understanding of language’s irreducible sociality lays the groundwork for a reconception of language’s relation to the world: in linguistic practices, we always have to engage in a struggle to open up linguistic structures to the world, such that language’s relation to the world cannot be taken for granted when thinking about the significance of the fact that language has any meaning at all. (shrink)

How is art both distinct and different from the rest of human life, while also mattering in and for it? This central yet overlooked question in contemporary philosophy of art is at the heart of Georg Bertram's new aesthetic. Drawing on the resources of diverse philosophical traditions – analytic philosophy, French philosophy, and German post-Kantian philosophy – his book offers a systematic account of art as a human practice. One that remains connected to the whole of life.

The paper aims at reevaluating a conception of the aesthetic that was developed by Kant and Hegel but that has been widely neglected due to the fact that their positions in aesthetics have been wrongly considered to be antagonistic to one another. The conception states that the aesthetic is a practice of reflecting on other human practices. Kant was the first to articulate this conception, but nevertheless falls short of giving a satisfying account of it, as he doesn’t succeed in (...) explaining its objective aspect. I claim that Hegel resolves this problem by understanding works of art as objects that thermalize essential orientations of historical-cultural practices. But his explanation fails to grasp the specificity of art as a reflective practice. However, Hegel’s position gives us a hint for how to deal with this problem: Reflection has to be understood in a practical, and not in a cognitive sense. (shrink)

Les diverses formes de vie en commun appellent des modalités de reconnaissance très différentes. Mais il s'agit toujours de combats pour une insertion sociale réussie. Voici une tentative de déclinaison de la nature sociale de l'homme de façon à saisir les grammaires de l'humain comme les grammaires de la reconnaissance. Plusieurs articles en allemand et en anglais.

My purpose in this essay is to provide a critical survey of arguments within recent analytic philosophy regarding the so-called “mind-body problem” with a particular view toward the relationship between these arguments and the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead (and Charles Hartshorne’s closely related views).1In course, I shall argue that Whitehead’s panexperientialist physicalism avoids paradoxes and difficulties of both materialist-physicalism and Cartesian dualismas advocated by a variety of analytic philosophers. However, and I believe that this point is not often sufficiently recognized, (...) analytic philosophy of mind is no monolith, and there are those who have found some form of panexperientialism to be attractive enough to merit serious consideration or even full-fledgedacceptance (David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Ralph Pred, William Seager, and Galen Strawson among them). A critical discussion of such thinkers should beincluded in any adequate survey of the relation between process panexperientialism and the analytic tradition. Moreover, the revisionary strain of the analyticaltradition which looks to natural science for its construction of worldviews (Broad, Russell, Bunge, Carnap, Quine, etc.) would move us in the direction of examining arguments concerning Whitehead’s view and contemporary empirical scientific considerations. (For a discussion of the basic nature of analytic philosophy and the descriptive and revisionary approaches contained within it, see my Process and Analysis, 5-9, 12-13, 57; and McHenry.) Here I shall argue that Whiteheadian panexperientialism very naturally accommodates important aspects of quantum theory, including the top-down causation involved in neuroplastic phenomena under a quantum mechanical interpretation of brain processes and in so-called Quantum Zeno Effect. The overall picture which emerges is that Whitehead’s position is (at the very least) a strongly plausible alternative in philosophy of mind.While I must confess that this essay can only represent the merest sketch—indeed an adequate treatment of the richly complex interpretive, comparative, and substantive philosophical issues here requires at the very least a monograph—I nonetheless hope to present a coherent and useful précis of major arguments and comparative conceptual relationships, especially for the reader who may not be readily familiar with this terrain. I thus hope that this essay will serve as a short expository and critical introduction to the interface between process and analytic philosophy of mind, and a presentation of the several theoretical advantages gained by listening to Whitehead’s theory as it connects with concerns of analytic philosophers.I shall proceed by first working though the main outlines of John Searle’s important and widely reaching “The Recent History of Materialism,” an essay which exposes critical flaws in a variety of materialist theories in ways which Whiteheadians should find especially fitting and congenial. I shall then examine defenses of dualism and the relation of Whitehead to such defenses, followed by a separate section on Chalmers, Nagel, and Pred. I will then consider a number ofimportant objections to process panexperientialism, including objections arising from the work of Jaegwon Kim and John Searle. I close with a discussion of thementioned empirical scientific arguments. (shrink)

Philosophers who have a conception of morality that allows for an ultimate conflict between duty and self-interest inherit a most difficult problem: the problem of the unity of practical reason. As long as duty is thought of as an extension of self-interest, as apparently both Plato and Hobbes thought, no theoretical difficulty arises; practical reason is unified simply because duty and interest have the same goal. But once this kind of conceptual connection between duty and self-interest is severed, the task (...) is to avoid the philosophical nemesis of dualism, a conception of practical reason in which an individual’s choice between doing his duty and securing his interests is necessarily arbitrary as a matter of practical justification. Moreover, the difficulty is compounded when morality is conceived in such a way that a person has a morality only if his moral concerns have justificatory priority among his practical concerns. When built into the concept of morality, this sort of justificatory priority might initially appear to restore the unity lost by practical reason with the severance of duty and interest. But so achieved, the unity bears all the marks of having been gained arbitrarily, for it can just as plausibly be said that a person is an egoist only if his own interests take justificatory priority among his practical concerns. Faced then with a decision about what he ought to do in a situation in which duty and interest are in conflict, the practical reasoner confronts a dilemma. In trying to decide what he ought to do, practical reason, in the form of morality, advises him to do one thing, yet in the form of self-interest, it advises him to do another. Therefore, like Humpty Dumpty, once practical reason is shattered by the separation of duty and interest, the practical reasoner’s problem is how to put things back together again. (shrink)

Although social contracts theory has been applied to organizations (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994), rarely has the theory been tested empirically. This article uses the traditions of communitarianism and individualism to instantiate an ideal-type economic social contract. We asked 269 subjects to complete the Ideological Orientation Scale and to make judgments on eight downsizing scenarios. Using social judgment theory, we assess the direct and indirect influences of ideology on judgments of fairness. Our findings suggest that ideology indeed shapes individual’s conceptions of (...) organizational fairness. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Malone-France’s anti-realistic interpretation of the Hartshorne-Peirce theory of possibles can be challenged in a number of ways. While his interpretation does suggest that there are in fact two distinct accounts of possibility in Hartshorne’s philosophy, one that is vulnerable to an antirealistic interpretation and one that is not, Hartshorne does have a consistent and defensible doctrine of possibles. I argue that Whitehead’s contrasting “nonprotean” theory of possibles or “eternal objects” has its own set of (...) conundrums to face, including problems with the coherence of the notion of the completeness of eternal objects and problems with infinite regresses. Whether Whitehead’s or Hartshorne’s account of possibles is correct, I concur with Malone-France that the Molinist doctrine of divine knowledge of future contingents is flawed. (shrink)

Without question, Process Philosophy and Political Liberalism: Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne, is Daniel Dombrowski's most important and well-argued treatise to date within his growing, prolific literary corpus. Bringing his expertise on John Rawls's political thought to bear on the process thinking of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne, he explores commonalities of approach and ventures the interpretive hypothesis that Rawls is, at least broadly speaking, a process philosopher. He also argues that each of these philosophers appropriately shares the appellation “political liberal” (...) when that term is carefully defined. I find this strongly plausible. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

S76 1992 305.8—dc20 92-25829 "The Ethnographer's Magic: Fieldwork in British Anthropology from Tylor to Malinowski" was originally published in Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork (History of Anthropology Vol. ... Toward a History of the Interwar Years" was originally published in Selected Papers from the American Anthropologist, 1921-45, edited by George W . Stocking, Jr., pp.

The first English translation of Hegel's important lectures on logic.

"A very fine piece of work, essential reading for anyone concerned with Kant, Aristotelian ethics, practical reason, and more generally, the foundations of moral value and justification.... The examples are a real strength, insightful and very well-chosen."--Anthony Cunningham, St. John's University "The issues Harris has taken on are among the most important in contemporary moral thinking, and he has handled them systematically, innovatively, wisely, with wit and good sense."--J. K. Swindler, Wittenberg University.

Surely one of the more remarkable, if not the most remarkable of the differences between the versions of Kant’s critical philosophy recently given us by Professor J. F. Bennett and Professor P. F. Strawson, lies in the diverse and even incompatible accounts of Kant’s transcendental idealism presented by these two first-rate analytic-philosophical interpreters of Kant. It is the purpose of this paper to set in the light and to explore some of the differences between these accounts.

This essay critically evaluates the claim that competition in medicine destroys the moral integrity of the traditional patient-physician relationship. The author argues that the traditional patient-centered ethic is indefensible on moral grounds, and that it should be jettisoned in favor of a fiduciary ethic. A fiduciary ethic is found to provide the best defensible account of the patient-physician relationship because it takes seriously the roles economic efficiency, competition, and respect for individual self-determination play in fashioning moral health care delivery. Keywords: (...) competition, patient-physician relationship, fiduciary ethic, patient-centered ethic CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In this paper, we develop an understanding of recognition in terms of individuals’ capacity for conflict. Our goal is to overcome various shortcomings that can be found in both the positive and negative conceptions of recognition. We start by analyzing paradigmatic instances of such conceptions—namely, those put forward by Axel Honneth and Judith Butler. We do so in order to show how both positions are inadequate in their elaborations of recognition in an analogous way: Both fail to make intelligible the (...) fundamental nexus between relations of recognition and individuals’ capacity for conflict. We then move on to reconsider aspects of Hegel's view of recognition—ones that, from our viewpoint, have been unjustly neglected in the debate about recognition: his focus on the constitution of relations of recognition in conflict and on the status of being an author of acts of recognition. On this basis, we then spell out in a more systematic way what we take to be a more convincing conception of recognition. This puts us in the position to gesture at some consequences of this conception in practical contexts, above all with regard to the justification, role and structure of political institutions. (shrink)

Intellectual contribution in the form of authorship is a fundamental component of the academic career. While research has addressed questionable and harmful authorship practices, there has largely been no discussion of how U.S. academic institutions interpret and potentially mitigate such practices through the use of institution-level authorship policies. To gain a better understanding of the role of U.S. academic institutions in authorship practices, we conducted a systematic review of publicly available authorship policies for U.S. doctoral institutions, focusing on components such (...) as specification of authorship criteria, recommendations for discussing authorship, dispute resolution processes, and guidance for faculty-student collaborations. We found that only 24% of the 266 Carnegie R1 and R2 Universities had publicly available authorship policies. Within these policies, the majority specified criteria for authorship, but provided less guidance about actual processes for applying such criteria, handling authorship disputes, and managing faculty-student author teams. Further, we found that any discussion of dispute resolution practices typically lacked specificity. Recommendations grounded in these findings are offered for institutions to leverage their ability to guide the authorship process by adopting an authorship policy that acknowledges disciplinary diversity while still offering substantive guidance. (shrink)

The obedience leitmotif complements the tension centered in the sacrifice and enables the good news of Isaac's salvation to stand as a reaffirmation of the patriarchal promise.